*This analysis assumes Russia puts in place the assets necessary for a full scale invasion of Ukraine. As of January 20 2022 that is not the case.
How could a war in Ukraine unfold if an invasion takes place in coming weeks? Our secret source inside the Kremlin* has leaked the Russian war plan, and it reinforces that any Russian invasion of Ukraine will be a huge undertaking, resulting in enormous financial cost and loss of life, with easy victory for Russia not guaranteed.
CONDITIONS: January/February weather is cold, but conducive to operations with armored vehicles, with temperatures between 20-30F or 0-5C, and with a 30% chance of snow on any day.
Geographically, it is the second largest country of Europe after Russia, only slightly smaller in area than Texas. Its capital, Kiev, is 175 miles from the eastern border with Russia, 60 miles from Russia-friendly Belarus, or 300 miles from Russian separatist-held territory in the country's south-east Donbas region. The Russian controlled Black Sea and Crimea are in the south.
ORDER OF BATTLE: NATO will offer cyber, space, electronic warfare, surveillance and materiel support to Ukraine, but will not actively engage in the conflict. Russian forces will be allowed freedom of air-ground movement by the sympathetic govt of neighboring Belarus. Therefore Ukraine will need to stand alone against Russia in a war in which Russia can potentially attack across three fronts.
UKRAINE VS RUSSIA
Ground troops: 129,000 (U) vs 80,000 (R) Tanks: 1,150 vs 270 Combat aircraft/helos: 231 vs 140 Warships (Black Sea): 10 vs 19 Space: Ukraine may have access to some NATO satellite intel, Russia has significantly more assets available Cyber: Ukraine has limited capability as demonstrated by the recent and successful Russian cyber attack on Ukraine which shut down hundreds of Ukraine government websites, and was likely a rehearsal for a larger scale attack.
Important in considering this Order of Battle, which can appear to favor Ukraine, is that Russia can replace any losses of armor, aircraft and troops from a huge reserve. With no support from neighboring countries or NATO, Ukraine cannot.
INVENTORIES: In terms of inventory, Russia will be fielding its latest main battle tanks, the T-90 A & M, and we will see combat-hardened air units from Syria engaged, which means extensive use of Su-24 & 25 ground attack aircraft, and Su-30 & 34 fighters. Tu-160 strategic bombers launching cruise missiles can also be called on. Will we see Russia deploy its new Su-57 stealth aircraft over Ukraine? No. The small number of Su-57 aircraft in active service is of no strategic importance, to the contrary, Russia is actively trying to sell its stealth technology globally and the loss of even a single stealth fighter inside Ukraine would be a disaster for this ambition.
Against these, Ukraine will pit its recently upgraded T-84 main battle tanks, of which it has only a dozen, and Soviet-era T-80s, T-72s and T-64s. But it is likely the US will allow Ukraine to use a shipment of 30-40 Javelin anti-tank missile systems sent last year, and these, together with its home-grown Stugna-P anti-tank missile system, may be sufficient to have a strategic impact against Russian armor.
In the air, Ukraine has the equivalent of two squadrons of Su-24 & Su-25 attack aircraft and about 70 Su-27 and Mig-29 fighters. Importantly though, Ukraine's air defense system includes largely Russian-made Su-300 and Buk missile systems. We can expect Russia to be expert in jamming and destroying Russian-designed air defense systems.
At sea, Russia has several Kilo class submarines each capable of launching 4 Khalibr cruise missiles. This limited capability will not be pivotal in the ground war, unless they achieve a lucky 'decapitation' strike on the Ukrainian govt or military leadership. The aging Russian Black Sea surface fleet is not capable of launching cruise missiles but its complement of one cruiser + a handful of frigates will be able to provide ground to air missile coverage of the air over southern Ukraine, to facilitate any troop landings or movement out of Crimea. It has several Rapoucha II class assault ships that could land 10 MBTs and 300 troops each on Ukraine's southern coast.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: Russia has significant freedom of action in deciding when and how to attack Ukraine. It currently has 100,000+ troops along Ukraine's eastern border. It has a friendly nation in Belarus which would allow Russian troops and aircraft to transit through its territory to attack Ukraine from the north. And it can land troops and tanks in Ukraine's south, or attack out of the Russian-held Crimea and Donbas regions. As mentioned, relative to Ukraine it has a virtually bottomless reserve of troops, aircraft and armor that it can bring in from other military districts.
OBJECTIVES: Kiev - Only 175 miles from the Ukraine-Russia border, lies the Ukraine capital of Kiev. More worryingly, Kiev is only 60 miles from the Russian-friendly Belarus border. Kiev can be expected to come under significant pressure in the first days of the war through cyber attacks, sabotage and air attacks aimed at degrading air defenses and command and control systems. It should be noted that in the 2nd World War, Russian forces attacking from the east took several weeks to encircle and re-capture Kiev from Germany, due to the difficulty of bridging that city's natural Dnieper river defenses. Russian air and mobile artillery superiority could be decisive in this battle.
The Dnieper river bridges: this large waterway bisects Ukraine from north to south, running through Kiev. Securing bridges across the Dnieper has been a major priority in battles for Kiev throughout history, but may not be as critical in this context, as Russia can move troops across the Dnieper in the north (Belarus) without interference, or bypass it in the south with amphibious landings.
Karkhiv/Donetsk: Russian backed separatists in the Donbas region are dug in just a mile from Ukraine troops in this region. With the support of Russian regular air and ground forces, it is probable the Ukrainian defenses in the south-east would be overcome, but the battle would be particularly bloody and it may serve Russia better to simply engage Ukraine troops here and pin them in place to prevent them being used elsewhere. Donetsk airport however would be a logical objective. It would make sense for Russia to try to establish a contiguous corridor from the Donbas region to Crimea along the southern coast, possibly including Odesa.
The West, Lviv: if forced to retreat from Donetsk and Kiev, it is probable Ukrainian ground forces and its government would retreat west, toward the NATO state of Poland and try to hold the Ukrainian city of Lviv, a major commercial and industrial city with a large ethnic Polish population. With its back protected by NATO and strong Polish interest in the safety of its nationals in the city, it is possible Ukrainian forces could hold Lviv and region with fuel and ammunition supplied covertly through Poland, if enough Ukrainian troops/armor remain from the first week(s) of war.
Nuclear power: Finally, any consideration of strategic objectives in a Ukraine-Russia conflict has to take account of Ukraine's reliance on nuclear energy. Ukraine is heavily dependent on nuclear energy from 15 reactors at 4 sites: two in the south, and two in the west of the country. Russia could make these sites strategic targets in order to cripple the Ukraine power grid. Destroying them could cause long term radioactive contamination, which Russia would not want, but capturing or disabling them (eg through special forces or cyber attacks) might be considered.
THE RUSSIAN BATTLE PLAN: Considering the above, and the pattern of air power use by Russia in Syria, the following scenario seems possible.
- Overall objective, Russia: capture Kiev and force the Ukrainian government to flee, returning most of Eastern Ukraine to Russian control to allow a 'free and democratic' vote by Ukrainian citizens about rejoining the Russian Federation. - Phase one (days 0-2): Russian cyber and electronic warfare attack to disrupt utilities and command, communication and control systems. Seize airfields to prevent air resupply from outside Ukraine and allow Russian troop deployment. Air attack to degrade air defenses. -Phase two (days 2-5): Russian ground forces main invasion. A feint at one point, at least, along the border may attempt to draw Ukrainian armor away from the main line of attack, which may be the purpose of recent Belarus-Russia military exercises. If not disrupted by cyber-attacks, special forces operations against Ukraine nuclear facilities may be considered. - Phase 3 (weeks 1-3): combined forces multi-domain attacks on several fronts. Main armored push from Russia in the northeast and Belarus in the north, attempting to seize Kiev as quickly as possible. Probing attacks or feints in the Donbas to test Ukrainian defences would probably resolve into a holding action intended to tie down Ukrainian troops in the southeast.
For comparison, and a possible estimate of the duration of this phase if the battle favors Ukraine and their forces succeed in holding Russian forces back, think of the US push out of Kuwait to capture Baghdad, which took around 20 days.
- Phase IV (weeks 4 >?): Only if Russia is planning a full scale invasion. Breakout from Kiev, capture of Western Ukraine. This is unlikely, and if Kiev has been captured, unnecessary. Russian armor pushes west from Kiev to central and western Ukraine. From the south, successful amphibious landings in the Crimea and Odessa would see a significant armored force driving up into central Ukraine from the south coast.
If we assume the Ukrainian govt will attempt to hold Lviv in the northwest on the border with NATO's Poland, then a defensive perimeter will be drawn around that city, probably based on holding the E50 highway and woods in the south and the T1425 north-south artery and wooded country in the east. If these fall, a retreat to the E40 ring road around Lviv would probably allow a last ditch defense and may prove to be the point at which Russian forces choose to halt, rather than risk a confrontation with Poland and NATO by threatening the ethnic Polish population of Lviv.
Some analysts have speculated that a 'shock and awe' campaign by Russia could see a collapse among Ukrainian forces similar to that seen in Afghanistan, and a war of only one week to ten days is possible. Several factors speak against this.
Firstly, in the ongoing Donbas civil war, Ukraine government forces have shown they are both capable, and resolute. After initial advances by Russian-backed separatists, govt forces regained territory and are now holding their ground. Secondly, since Russia's 2014 intervention in Donbas, Ukrainian negativity toward Russia has grown year on year, from just 10% unfavorable in 2013 to 60% unfavorable in 2021. A recent newspaper poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed 33 pc of Ukrainians would be willing to take up arms against Russia in case of an invasion, and a further 21% would support civil protests and civil disobedience against Russian intervention.
However, in the same survey, fifty percent of the population said they would not fight, but would either flee, or 'do nothing'. On balance, a quick capitulation by Ukraine forces seems unlikely and a costly, bloody war the most likely outcome of a Russian invasion.
Putin's fixation on Ukraine and fear of NATIO encroachment is not shared by the Russian public. A December 2021 report in the Moscow Times newspaper stated that only 17 percent of voters supported Ukrainian reunification with Russia.
Whether Putin really considers the cost of bringing Ukraine back into the Russian sphere worth bearing - for historical, cultural and economic reasons, and as a bulwark against NATO expansion - only time will tell. But as the above analysis shows, any military conflict in Ukraine is going to be very, very bloody.
ADDENDUM: There is of course another scenario entirely. Russian agents in Ukraine foment unrest through the pro-Russian population in eastern Ukrainian cities (Kharkiv for example), leading to street protests and violence. (A reverse of the 'Dignity Revolution' anti-Russian protests which moved Ukraine into the Western sphere in 2014.) This would be followed by a limited Russian invasion to capture Kharkiv, join it with separatist forces in Donbas, and destabilize the Ukraine govt. The forces being assembled by Russia as of early Feb 22 appear excessive for this limited scenario.
* There is no secret source.. All analysis is based on open source information.