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After ten months, what I got wrong about Ukraine

And what I got right...

My bads

Strategy: Luckily, I badly overestimated - like most commentators and analysts - Russian warfighting capability. I predicted (above) a lightning fast advance using combined air, ground, space and naval forces that would take Kiev and the east within three months. So wrong. What happened showed that Russian combined arms operations aren't, the Russian air force and navy wasn't, Russian cyber attacks don't, and Russian logistics can't.

On the other hand, with support of weapons from the West, Ukraine can.

After ten months Russia has still doubled the territory its Luhansk and Donetsk proxies have held since 2014, but Ukraine also made significant ground in counter-offensives since May.


Russia's military technology - overestimated in just about every book I've written.

The Air Force that isn't. The Russian air force performed so badly in the first months of the Ukraine war it was not even allowed by Putin to make an appearance on Victory Day.

The Su-57 stealth fighter (of which it supposedly has several) has had no impact, if indeed it has been used at all. After early losses over Ukraine, Russia's air force has stayed safely inside Russia's borders, launching air to ground cruise missiles at standoff ranges.

The Su-57, also invisible to the naked eye over Ukraine...


The Ground Force with tanks from the 1980s. The T-14 Armata, often touted as Russia's most advanced Main Battle Tank and featured in Future War novels - has also not been seen in combat in Ukraine. It barely even made it to the Victory Parade. Three exampes were listed in the program, but only two appeared, as the third broke down. Instead, while it rolled into Ukraine with a range of more modern T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks, Russia has recently been seen pulling T-64 tanks made in the 1980s out of storage for use in Ukraine.

Not saluting, waving for a tow truck...


What else did I get wrong? I was very worried Russia would resort to using tactical nukes in the battle for Kherson, rather than accept another humiliating withdrawal. But it seems the Russian leadership's willingness to accept defeat is about the only area it has exceeded expectations.


Cyber: It seems Russia has better criminal hackers, than military. In the early days of the conflict hackers attacked Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, putting some out of action for a few days and knocking out a single commercial communication satellite. The cyber warfare impact on the conflict has been minimal, and Russian successes negligible. They do appear to have moved into a more sophisticated use of cyber recently though, with cyber attacks on power and water infrastructure coordinated with missile strikes.


That's my list of bad calls, usually through over estimating Russia's capabilities.


What have I gotten right?

The invasion: I called it in December, it started in February. Not through any special insight but through a thorough reading of Putin's speeches and writings from about 2020 onwards. So if you think the plot of Bering Strait (Russia tries to take control of the Bering Strait) or Kobani (Russia supports a Syrian attack into Turkey) or Orbital (Russia strikes global oil infrastructure to drive up oil prices) are far fetched, then you were probably one of the ones saying Putin would not invade Ukraine, right?

I remember a quote from a reader review of Bering Strait: "Another novel in which Russia is the bad guy. Yawn. The world has moved on even if thriller writers haven't."


Drones. In the Future War series, drones rule the skies. And in Ukraine the biggest game changer has been both sides' use of drones. From the Ukrainians' Turkish-made Bayraktars ...


To the Russian Zala Lancet ...

Or the multitude of hobby drones used by squads and artillery spotters for target location and reconnaissance, drones have changed the battlefield forever.

But what about HIMARS (the US made precision fires rocket system) you ask? Surely that has been the biggest game changer?

No. HIMARS, like any artillery whether high or low precision, needs targets. Targets have to be located, and their coordinates passed to the HIMARS batteries. How is this done? Drones.

Every military is taking lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the biggest one will be that you cannot have enough drones, or precision artillery. You need them for tactical intelligence and surveillance, from squad level and up. You need them for monitoring enemy movement, identifying targets for precision attacks. You need them for ground support against mobile forces. And you need them swarming, on both land and sea ...

Ukraine has launched successful air-sea swarming attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet, claiming one cruiser sunk and a second damaged.


Thermobarics. Russia has relied on brute force to prosecute its war and artillery has been its main offensive weapon. As predicted in Future War novels, it has not hesitated to use its fuel-air explosive weapons against Ukrainian troops and civilian targets. Below is the TOS-1 'flame thrower'.

Thermobaric weapons have been deployed either as rockets or bombs, in one massive strike from a MOAB (mother of all bombs, below)...

Or from rocket launchers as incendiary bomblets, scattered over civilian centers ...

Russia's list of allies: Nothing like a war to show who your friends really are. Future War novels have been right to show alliances between Russia, Syria and Iran or North Korea. And also right to put heavyweights like India and China in the 'not quite sure' zone.


One last thing I've learned: I need to revisit my timelines. In my novels I have swarming drones and missiles, autonomous naval vehicles, and uncrewed fighter aircraft all being commonplace about ten years out, but that should be five.


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